Computer Network Defense: Compromise Detection Prototype

Carl Beisel, Jim Jones, Christian Iivari

NATIONAL SECURITY • ENERGY & ENVIRONMENT • HEALTH • CYBERSECURITY

SAIC®

The Problem

- **Zero Day Attacks:**
  - How and when does a novel, previously unknown attack first get discovered? Can that attack be detected and stopped before affected systems are compromised and exploited?
- **Problem:**
  - Signature based detection patterns are based on having discovered, evaluated and defined patterns for the attack. Behavior based detection has high false positives.
- **Approach:**
  - Non-signature, non-behavior based detection
  - Attack Modeling: reason over observables (indicators, anomalies, second-order effects, etc.)

SAIC®

Technical Approach

- **Perform Deep Packet Inspection** of network traffic and capture of packets of interest matching one of our 16+ observable rules
  - Observables represent pieces of evidence relevant to the activities an attacker may perform during an attack as represented by the following transition states:
    - Vulnerability Research
    - Exploit Development and Testing
    - Reconnaissance
    - Exploit Execution
    - Cleaning Activities
    - Back Door Installation
  - Outputs observables for analysis by the reasoning model

- **Assess the likelihood of an attack** using HyReM
  - Use Bayesian Network model to accumulate and assess evidence and calculate the likelihood of a successful attack (i.e., a compromise).

- **Provide graphical output** to a user indicating the likelihood of an attack.
  - Graphical depiction of analysis and calculated 'Likelihood of System Compromise'
  - Can be enhanced to interface with widely used network monitoring and alert tools.

SAIC®

Architecture – Inspect, Analysis, Report, Protect

Zero Day Attack Identification and Cyber Defense



SAIC®

Experimental Environment

Virtual Machine Configuration: Four VMs to monitor and analyze network traffic, attacker and victim.

- **SNORT Monitor (Backtrack 5.0 on Ubuntu Linux):**
  - **Snort IDS (Live monitoring)**
- **Zero Day Attack Monitor (Ubuntu Linux):**
  - **Capture Tool (LibPCAP)**
  - **HyReM – Zero Day Attack Analysis/GUI (Demo)**
- **Attacker (Backtrack 5.0 on Ubuntu Linux):**
  - **Attacks (Metasploit, Minishare)**
- **Victim (Win XP SP1 a, has numerous vulnerabilities):**
  - **Clean snapshot re-instated after each experiment**



Experiment Results

One result per test.

						HyReM	Snort			
Test #	Pcap File	Pcap Packet Cnt	Description	Obs File	Total Obs Cnt	Likelihood of Compromise	Snort Alerts	Priority 1	Priority 2	Priority 3
1	1.pcap	2179	Metasploit exploit ms04-011	1_obs.pcap	89	0.9740	13	2	8	3
2	2.pcap	2588	Metasploit exploit ms03-026	2_obs.pcap	105	0.9905	12	2	8	2
3	3.pcap	2420	Metasploit exploit ms08-067	3_obs.pcap	102	0.9742	12	2	8	2
4	4.pcap	1669	Minishare - noisy	4_obs.pcap	90	0.9753	13	2	8	3
5	5.pcap	1642	Minishare - moderate	5_obs.pcap	103	0.9752	10	2	6	2
6	87.pcap	311+5339	Minishare - quiet	8_obs.pcap	6	**0.7803**	0	0	0	0
7	6.pcap	325	Clean 1	6_obs.pcap	2	0.0141	0	0	0	0
8	7.pcap	5339	Clean 2	7_obs.pcap	0	0.0100	5	0	5	0
9	14.pcap	3848	Chronological merge of files 1 and 4	14_obs.pcap	181	0.9970	23	4	16	3
10	26.pcap	2913	Chronological merge of files 2 and 6	26_obs.pcap	108	0.9915	12	2	8	2
11	46.pcap	1994	Chronological merge of files 4 and 6	46_obs.pcap	92	0.9792	13	2	8	3
12	57.pcap	6981	Chronological merge of files 5 and 7	57_obs.pcap	128	0.9752	15	2	11	2
13	347.pcap	9428	Chronological merge of files 3, 4, and 7	347_obs.pcap	219	0.9970	31	4	21	6

Noisy Attack | Quiet Attack | Clean | False Positive

Our approach found an attack that the standard toolset missed

SAIC

Test Environment – Optimal Configuration



1a/b – Document Capture & HyReM Results
2 – Compare with Snort Alerting
3 – Inject Cyber Attacks
4 – Inject Live/Simulated Network Data Flow

SAIC

Compromise Model and Observables



SAIC®

Observable Modeling