

Combinatorial Analysis Utilizing Logical Dependencies Residing On Networks (CAULDRON)

Professor Sushil Jajodia


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Outline

- Problem
- Approach
- Integration with IDSs
- Demo



Limitations of Vulnerability Scanners

- Generate overwhelming amount of data
- Example Nessus scan
 - Elapsed time: 00:48:07
 - Total security holes found: 255
 - High severity: 40
 - Low severity: 117
 - Informational: 98
- No indication of how vulnerabilities can be combined
- Can an outside attacker obtain access to the Crown Jewels?
- Where does a security administrator start?

Limitations of IDSs

- Generate overwhelming number of alerts
- Many false alerts – normal traffic or failed attacks
- Alerts are isolated
- No indication of how alerts can be combined
- Incomplete alert information
- Where does a security administrator start?
- Is the attacker trying to obtain access to Crown Jewels?
- Require extensive human intervention

Summary

- Current security measures largely independent
- Little synergy among tools
- Vulnerabilities considered in isolation may seem acceptable risks, but attackers can combine them to produce devastating results

What is lacking?

- Context for total network security
- How outsiders penetrate firewalls and launch attacks from compromised hosts
- Insider attacks

Simply Listing Problems Misses the Big Picture!



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

Penetration Testing



- Few experts available
- Red teams can be expensive
- Tedious
- Error-prone
- Impractical for large networks
- No formal claims

Attack Graphs

- An attacker breaks into a network through a chain of exploits where each exploit lays the groundwork for subsequent exploits
- Chain is called an attack path
- Set of all possible attack paths form an attack graph
- Generate attack graphs to mission critical resources
- Report only those vulnerabilities associated with the attack graphs











Reference

- Sushil Jajodia, Steve Noel, Brian O'Berry, "Topological analysis of network attack vulnerability," in *Managing Cyber Threats: Issues, Approaches and Challenges*, Vipin Kumar, Jaideep Srivastava, and Aleksandar Lazarevic, eds., Springer, 2005, pages 248-266.








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
- Lingyu Wang, Steven Noel, Sushil Jajodia, "Minimum-cost network hardening using attack graphs," Computer Communications, 2006.

Attack Graph Visualization Problem






**Even small
networks can
yield complex
attack graphs!**

23



24





27

Limitations of IDSs

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Alert Correlation


- Correlate alerts to build attack scenarios
- For efficient response, this must be done in real time

Attack Graph Approach


- Provides context for alarms
- Can help with forensic analysis, attack response, attack prediction

Hypothesizing and Predicting Alerts


- Correlation based on the prepare-for relationship is vulnerable to alerts missed by IDSs - Reassembling a broken attack scenario is expensive and error-prone
- By reasoning about the *inconsistency* between the knowledge (encoded in attack graph) and the facts (represented by received alerts), missing alerts can be hypothesized
- By extending the facts in a way that is consistent with the knowledge, possible consequences of current attacks can be predicted



32







Summary of CAULDRON

- Automated analysis of all possible attack paths through a network
 - Resulting attack “roadmap” provides context for optimal defenses
 - Transforms volumes of isolated facts into manageable, actionable results
- Integrates with existing tools for capturing network configuration
- Your network is provably secure, with minimum effort
- **Best tool for making informed decisions about network security**

36

Further Information:



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